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 THE FIRST OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: 
BETWEEN DEEPENING AND REVISION (2000-2002) 
 
 
The debate on Europe’s future was sparked in the spring of 2000 in the middle of the 
Intergovernmental Conference when the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in a 
much-talked-about speech expressed the need for an in-depth political reflection on the 
purpose and future of Europe’s construction process. It wasn’t long before the main 
political leaders of Member States and other European institutions responded, each of 
them putting forward their vision and possible solutions for the challenges that lay ahead. 
The debate had just begun.  
In December, the Nice European Summit approved the Treaty that bears its name 
and included a Declaration, Number 23, on the future of Europe. This declaration stressed 
the need for profound reform of the European Union subject to a wide-ranging and open 
debate to be promoted by European states and institutions. The Laeken Declaration, 
announced a year later in December 2001, is the first bold concerted step of this new 
debate. Its novel language examines the Union’s challenges and the reforms required to 
meet these challenges, expressed in sixty-five questions. The Declaration entrusts the 
Intergovernmental Conference related tasks to a Convention similar to the one that 
drafted the European Union’s Bill of Fundamental Rights. 
The European Convention, comprising representatives of all European 
legitimacies, is at a pivotal point where the first agreements have been reached and the 
differences between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists are coming to the 
surface. The Convention’s chances of success will depend on its ability to agree on a 
constitutional treaty. The draft outline for this Treaty has been made public. As the work 
on the Convention progresses, it will be necessary to start filling in the blanks. The 
Constitutional Treaty Draft Project, with a strong federalist bias, seems to be a good start. 
It demonstrates that the Convention method works, that it enables a democratic and open 
debate in touch with civil society and that it is capable of achieving results. 
 
The Transformation of the European Community into a Union as a Subject for 
Debate (1980-2000) 
 
The European Union is currently immersed in one of the most intense phases of its short 
history, as it prepares to accept ten more member states in 2004 while simultaneously 
debating its future.  This debate is largely new and of far-reaching consequences. The 
discussion on the future of Europe has been in the making in the European Community 
since the eighties after the first direct European Parliamentary elections in 1979. This 
debate will put forth new transformation proposals, as envisaged in the Spinelli Draft 
  1 Treaty, and will bear fruit in the form of several reforms to the existing treaties.
1 After 
reflecting on the European Convention, the debate will culminate in the ratification of a 
constitutional treaty aimed at ensuring the working order and efficiency of a twenty-eight 
member state European Union. 
Why is the current debate so relevant? What part is a rehash of the traditional 
debate and what part is new? Will it be productive or just another inconsequential debate? 
The debate on the European project has made enormous strides in the past two years, re-
shifting its approach and taking a significant qualitative leap. Nevertheless, a large part of 
public opinion does not perceive it as such. The debate on the scope of the model, the 
method for reforming it and even its spectrum has changed, abandoning small revisions 
in favour of a global and core reform.
2 In this sense, one of the first consequences is the 
acceptance of a European Constitution, which, although referred to as a Constitutional 
Treaty, is perceived by some to have a different scope and meaning. 
Another new factor in this debate is that it is no longer exclusively limited to 
politicians, intellectuals, and political agents, but is open to all European citizens thanks 
to a new method, the European Convention. The European project has its precedent in 
classical post-Renaissance philosophy, crystallising in a specific debate after the World 
War I among the elite and intellectuals who articulated theoretical proposals.
3 After the 
Second World War, the project for European unity evolved into a democratic debate 
embracing not just intellectuals, but also political parties and social classes. It has 
evolved into a political debate, incorporated in the electoral programs that gave rise to 
treaties that served as the basis for the European Communities. The current debate may 
be the culmination of this evolution, another step taken to incorporate civil society and 
possibly become constitutional just when the unification of Europe is taking place. 
The debate between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists is undoubtedly 
an ongoing issue. The federalists’ goal is a true European federation, while the 
intergovernmentalists defend the co-operation among sovereign states based on 
confederation formulas. The European construction, as we know it, is a syncretism of 
both extremes as demonstrated by the pillar-based structure of the Treaty on European 
Union.  From a theoretical perspective, formulas combining both extremes have been put 
forward such as Croisat’s and Quermonne’s “intergovernmental federalism” strategy or 
Jacques Delors’
4  Federation of Nation-States. The constitutional Draft Treaty presented 
by the Praesidium in the Convention held on October 28, 2002, could also be considered 
                                                           
1 I have analysed the transformation process from a European Community of an economic nature towards a 
political European Union, a still incomplete transformation in: Francisco Aldecoa Luzarraga, European 
Integration. Análisis histórico-institucional con textos y documentos. Vol. II. The European Union’s 
Genesis and Development (1979-2002), Madrid: Tecnos, 2002. 
2 In weekly collaborations throughout 2001 and 2002 with the magazine La Clave, I have dealt with many 
of the aspects of the debate on the future of Europe, particularly in issues number: 36, 39, 40, 46, 47, 61, 
72, 74, 80 and 82. 
3 For some background on the European project, see: Antonio Truyol y Serra, European Integration. 
Análisis histórico-institucional con textos y documentos. Vol. I. Génesis y desarrollo de la Comunidad 
Europea (1951-1979), Madrid: Tecnos, 1999.  
4 See  Maurice Croisat and Jean-Louis Quermonne, L’Europe et le fédéralisme, Paris: Montchrestien, 1999. 
  2 an all-embracing syncretism between federalism and intergovernmentalism, although it 
will be necessary to opt for one formula or another with respect to certain issues. 
At the current stage of the Convention, the issues mainly involve the scope of the 
results, and are beginning to bear fruit. The question now is whether the Constitutional 
Treaty will take the shape of a treaty (more intergovernmental) or a constitution (more 
federalist), whether it will develop the existing model or establish a new one, that is, 
stress the current model or a revision based on different assumptions. In any case, we can 
expect some emphasis on the current model, the scope of which is being debated. This 
implies great progress since what has been achieved to date is not being questioned. 
 
From Confederacy to Federation: Fischer’s Proposal 
 
The start of the new debate on Europe’s future can be said to have begun in the spring of 
2000 following Joschka Fischer’s speech, “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts 
on the Finality of European Integration” at the University of Humboldt in Berlin.
5 The 
2000 Intergovernmental Conference culminating in the Nice Treaty was fully underway. 
The agenda had been strictly limited to a few issues, only those necessary to proceed with 
the enlargement, generally perceived as exceedingly restrictive. Above all, the need for 
an overall reform was left very much up in the air since it was not desired to tackle this at 
the time because of the need for a quick Intergovernmental Conference ending in 
December 2000 to prevent any further delay in the enlargement process. 
The Convention responsible for drafting the European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was actively engaged at the same time. Politicians and analysts 
already sensed that the draft of this charter would include the kernel for a constitutional 
European construction, a perception that, in time, proved to have been accurate.
6  
Therefore, when Fischer proposed a broad reflection on the finality and scope of the 
European Union, the Union was immersed in two parallel constitutional political 
processes. 
In this context, on May 12, 2000, on the eve of the French-German Summit, 
Joschka Fischer, speaking at the University of Humboldt in Berlin put forward a 
federalist vision for the future of Europe. Although Fischer insisted that this was a purely 
personal reflection, no one at that time overlooked the significance of an initiative 
presented by a member of the German government, its “green” foreign minister and the 
representative of the new political coalition. The speech received widespread media 
                                                           
5 Joschka Fischer, “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” 
Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000, in: Francisco Aldecoa Luzarraga, European Integration... Vol. 
II. The European Union’s Genesis and Development (1979-2002), op. cit., pp. 774-778. 
6 European Parliament Resolution on drafting a Bill of Fundamental Rights for the European Union, 16 
March 2000, (A5-0064/2000) in: http://www.europarl.eu.int; Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, “Notes on 
the political and legal significance of the European Union’s Bill of Fundamental Rights,” Revista de 
Derecho Comunitario de la Unión Europea, Nº 9, January/June 2001, pp. 7-26; Koen Lenaerts and Eddy De 
Smijter, “A `Bill of Rights´ for the European Union,” Common Market Law Review, Nº 38, 2001, pp. 273-
300; Joseph H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 102. 
  3 coverage. Fischer’s proposal reflects the basic tenets of Germany’s political tradition on 
Europe with its triple Christian Democrat, Social Democrat and Liberal roots, although 
with a renewed boldness. 
Above all, Fischer’s speech expressed the need for reflecting on the definitive 
project for the construction of Europe before tackling the great enlargement, that is, 
before 2010. It champions an in-depth reform leading to a more transparent, democratic, 
and less bureaucratic system with strong federal institutions coalescing in a constitutional 
treaty. Fischer believes it is essential to create a strong federal Europe, made up of strong 
Nation-States, where the Union’s and the states’ competencies should be clearly defined. 
He believes that only then would a true Union of states and citizens be achieved.  
In line with the traditional theses defended by Germany, Fischer proposes a 
renewed institutional architecture for the new federal Union. He endorses the creation of 
a two-chamber European Parliament representing the Nation-State Europe and its citizens 
in an equal fashion. The constitution of the Union’s government could be based on two 
options: either by developing the current European Council into a European government 
comprising members of the national governments or by empowering the European 
Commission headed by a directly elected president with broad executive powers. 
He believes that Monnet’s method is no longer efficacious for proceeding with 
integration and mentions the three institutional challenges confronting Europe: 
addressing the lack of democracy and the establishment of a division of transparent 
competencies among the Union, the Nation-States and its regional entities, as well as 
among institutions. There is a need for a constituent treaty that sets clear boundaries 
between what should be regulated at the European and at the national level, a lean 
European Federation, but capable of acting, in a fully sovereign manner, based on 
Nation-States, and only engaging in core competencies. 
Lastly, Fischer asks what course should be taken to address the twin challenge of 
enlargement and deepening. States that do not wish or cannot proceed with the federation 
could paralyse an enlarged and more heterogeneous Union. An intermediate step along 
the road to political integration would be a centre of gravity comprising a group of states 
that would complete a new European framework treaty, the core of a constituent 
federation. Pursuant to this treaty, the federation would develop its own institutions: a 
government within the European Union that would speak with one voice, on as many 
issues as possible, on behalf of all the core members and a strong parliament with a 
directly elected president. This centre of gravity would be at the forefront of political 
integration and include, from its inception, all the elements of the future federation. The 
last step would be the completion of integration into a European federation. 
The following month, President Jacques Chirac made a speech, significantly 
entitled “Our Europe”
7  at the German Bundestag explaining his project for the twenty-
first century Europe. The French President took up the gauntlet thrown by Fischer and 
presented a model for the future of Europe, stressing the role of the states and proposing a 
                                                           
7  Jacques Chirac, “Our Europe”, Speech before the Bundestag, 27 June 2000, in: Francisco Aldecoa 
Luzarraga, European Integration Análisis histórico-institucional con textos y documentos. Vol. II. The 
European Union’s Genesis and Development (1979-2002), op. cit., pp. 782-784. 
  4 federation of states versus Germany’s European Federation. He also suggested that an in-
depth reflection period should ensue following the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference 
being held during those months, to consider the future of the Union and pave the way for 
a revision of the European project. Chirac believed that it was necessary to ponder issues 
such as the simplification of treaties to make them more comprehensible for the people, 
the division of competencies, the Union’s borders, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 
etc. In his opinion, the debate should include governments, citizens, national parliaments, 
European institutions, and candidate countries. The product of this debate would be a 
Constitution that the people would be called on for acceptance. 
A few days later, Gerhard Schröder and Giuliano Amato elaborated on Fischer’s 
proposals, with Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Tony Blair, José María Aznar and other European 
politicians and intellectuals
8  expressing their views a few months later. In short, a 
different and bolder political debate was underway; a debate that implied a confrontation 
of European construction doctrines. The French presidency formally presented its 
partners with Chirac’s proposal calling for a wide and open debate on Europe’s future as 
reflected in Declaration 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice. The political discussions had 
given way to a true political debate and an agenda for constitutional reform. 
The European politicians’ speeches in 2000 no longer remained disjointed but 
focused on a true political debate and the need to consider the future of the European 
construction after the methods of the founding fathers had been overtaken by events. It is 
a truly fruitful discussion not just because a new model emerged, but because it identified 
the true magnitude of this need and coalesced into a political agenda: Declaration 23 
annexed to the Treaty of Nice. 
 
The Paradox of Declaration 23 on the Future of Europe: Political but not Legal 
Validity 
 
The Treaty of Nice, even before its birth, even if stillborn, has set the constituent process 
in motion. The paradox of Declaration 23 stems from what many regretted at that time as 
the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference’s of the debate and overall reform proposed by 
Fischer. In the rush to conclude the Conference in December, it was decided to opt for a 
political programming of Declaration 23. Although this was a disappointment for many, 
it has proven to be efficient. The lack of legal efficacy was precisely what made the 
Declaration much bolder since, unlike the Treaty to which it was annexed, it was not 
subject to ratification and hence could be applied even if the Treaty of Nice was not 
enforced. 
 
                                                           
8 Gerhard Schröder and Giuliano Amato, “We are serious about the future of Europe,” Zeitgeschehen, Nº 
220, 21 September 2000, p. 16; Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Honoris Causa Doctorate Acceptance Speech, 
Leipzig University, 6 July 2000; Tony Blair, Speech in the Polish Stock Market, 6 October 2000, in: 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk; José María Aznar, Conference at the French Institute for International 
Relations, 26 September 2000 in: http://www.la-moncloa.es.  
 
  5   The Treaty of Nice consolidates the Union, enabling its enlargement and 
launching the constituent process with Declaration 23 on the future of the Union.
9 The 
European Parliament considers Declaration 23 as the implicit acknowledgement by the 
Heads of State and Government that the diplomatic revision methods envisaged by the 
treaties were obsolete for implementing the reforms required by the Union.
10 
Declaration 23 calls for the start of a wide and open debate on the future of 
Europe that would crystallise in a new Intergovernmental Conference on reform in 2004. 
In our opinion, it launches the process for a constitutional transformation since it 
expresses the need for a debate on questions involving the very foundations of the 
Union’s political system and reflects a political process embracing a continent-wide 
political union.
11 
This reform calls for a debate in 2001 open to all political, economic, academic 
and social sectors, civil society in general and member candidates. The European Council 
in December of that year would have to adopt a decision for continuing the reform 
process. The issues that the Declaration proposes as the subject of analysis are: the 
delimitation of powers between the Union and the member states reflecting the principle 
of subsidiarity; the statute of the European Union’s Bill of Fundamental Rights 
proclaimed in Nice in December 2000; the simplification of the treaties; and the role of 
national parliaments in the European institutional architecture. This list is not a numerus 
clausus at all since it leaves the door open for other questions that could be considered of 
interest. 
The first of these questions concerns the distribution of competencies with regard 
to the principle of subsidiarity and explicitly suggests a federal Union model that, up to 
then, had been simply implicit. It addresses the German länder’s demands for a catalogue 
of competencies that would enable them to clarify the internal powers between the 
German sate and themselves relative to the conception and application of community 
policies. The preparation of a catalogue reflecting the delimitation of powers paves the 
way for the region’s direct political involvement in the workings of the Union based on 
their own competencies. 
The incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the teaties was seen from its inception 
as the seed for the system’s constitutionality. Although the European Council in Nice had 
rejected its incorporation in the treaties, few doubted that this would just be a matter of 
time. Such inclusion was of primary political significance since the current idea of 
                                                           
9 Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Declaration 23 Annexed to the Treaty of Nice, 26 
February 2001, in: DOCE C 80, of 10.01.2001, pp. 85-86. 
10 The European Parliament’s resolution on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European Union, 31 
May 2001 (A5-0168/2001) in: http://www.europarl.eu.int  
11 I am aware of the reservations some may have in applying the terms “constituent” or “constitutional” to 
the European reform, since up to now, in terms of doctrine, the Constitution and constitutionalism were 
usually analysed from the perspective of the state theory. Nevertheless, in the last decade the term 
“transnational constitutionalism” has started to be applied to the construction of a political and 
supranational policy in Europe in the last decade.  See Renaud Dehousse, “The Birth of Transnational 
Constitutionalism,” International Forum, No.  2, April-June 2002, pp. 281-292. 
 
  6 democracy implies a delimitation of the rulers’ powers based on recognition of the rights 
of citizens.  In short, it provides legitimacy to the entire European political system. 
The inclusion of national parliaments in the Union’s institutional architecture was 
proposed by France and reflects the qualms of some national parliaments, such as the 
French General Assembly, of being gradually stripped of their competencies if sidelined 
from the institutional workings of the European Union. Lastly, the simplification of the 
treaties will undoubtedly increase the people’s awareness and grasp of the way in which 
the Union functions, a primary concern, particularly imperative after the Irish voted “no” 
on the ratification of the Treaty of Nice in 2001. 
The reflection on the future of Europe goes beyond these specific questions and 
the focus should be from a double perspective. Firstly, the finality of the European 
construction, that is, what is to be accomplished in common, and principles, objectives 
and ideals that should serve as a basis. Secondly, the political relations, and institutional 
systems and the resources deemed necessary to carry out the task defined from the outset. 
This is what is meant by the open debate on Europe’s future, known as Declaration 23, 
and that is nothing less than a reflection on the “constitution” in the material sense of this 
unidentified political reality. 
This Declaration’s highly political agenda launches the constituent process, 
providing a unique and unprecedented method at this stage of European construction, a 
debate open to civil society with democracy, legitimacy, and transparency as its 
objectives. The open discussion on the distribution of power between the Union and the 
states, the system’s legitimisation by including fundamental rights in its nucleus is, in this 
sense, a novel element in the European construction process. 
 
The First Bold Step in the New Debate: The Laeken Declaration 
 
The first tangible result of this new debate, the Laeken Declaration, is extremely relevant 
since firstly, it uses a new language, the expression of a new philosophy, and secondly, it 
makes a “maximalist” interpretation of Declaration 23 in a federalist tone, although, not 
explicitly mentioned, in the form of common questions. Although it is still too early to 
discern the momentousness of this Declaration in the European integration process, 
doctrine is beginning to value it quite positively since the results beginning to emerge 
from this debate are being translated into questions, which are common to all. 
The Laeken Declaration, adopted by the European Council in its meeting on the 
14th and 15th of December 2001, launches the second phase for preparing the reform 
envisaged in Declaration 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice for 2004 and follows the first 
stage that involves the debate open to all society.
12 Programmed at that time by 
Declaration 23, the Laeken Declaration sets the second stage of the constituent process, a 
                                                           
12 Laeken Declaration, the Presidency’s conclusions, Laeken European Council, 14 and 15 December, 
2001, in: http://ue.eu.int 
 
  7 structured debate that will serve as the basis for preparing the 2004 Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
The Laeken Declaration is divided into three very distinct parts: the first part 
defines the context, that is, it sets out the current reality of the European Union, the 
challenges it faces and how the reform must address these challenges. Secondly, it 
reflects on the tangible content that should serve as the basis for the reform, expressed in 
sixty-five questions emerging from the first phase of the common debate. Lastly, the 
Declaration sets out the procedure to be followed in the second phase of the reform, a 
Convention. 
The point of departure is the confirmation that there has been a transformation in 
the nature of the original sectoral European Communities. Now it is predominantly 
political, and hence, the Community method, which served as a guideline in the early 
days, should be replaced by another one more in line with the new undertaking: “The 
European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an 
economic and technical collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first elections to the 
European Parliament, the Community’s legitimacy, which until then had lain with the 
Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, construction of a 
political union has begun. (…) The European Union is a success story”. 
The Union stands at a crossroads, facing three challenges, which are also 
opportunities. First, the Union is about to expand and welcome ten more member states in 
2004 thereby bringing about the peaceful unification of Europe. Second, the key factor 
for the success of the European project implies bringing the Union closer to its citizens 
by changing the workings of the institutions, making them more transparent, efficient and 
subject to better democratic scrutiny. Citizens’ expectations concerning the Union’s 
involvement in those areas that they consider necessary must also be addressed. Third 
and lastly, the Union is confronted with the challenge of playing a leading role in the 
international global society. This offers the European Union a platform to develop its role 
as a civil player in international relationships, offering its values and social model as an 
alternative. Europe must have the means to shoulder its responsibilities in this new 
context and fight the risks brought to the limelight by the September 11
th events. 
The contents of the Declaration give us a glimpse of the progress made in the 
Union’s implicit federal vocation, although there are still certain intergovernmental limits 
stemming from the incomplete transformation of an economic European Community into 
a more political entity. The Declaration, however, makes no mention of federalism, 
apparently because of the veto of some of its members: Great Britain, Spain, and some 
Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, the federal model is implicit in the Declaration, 
promoted by the Belgian government, which drafted this declaration during its half-year 
presidency. 
With respect to the constituent process agenda, the Declaration establishes wide-
ranging contents to serve as the basis for a structured debate. Indeed, it expressly includes 
an analysis of the “conclusions of the public debate,” specifically considering the points 
in Declaration 23 and an analysis of an in-depth institutional reform which would go as 
far as altering the traditional inter-institutional balance. A clearer definition of the 
  8 institutions’ powers and functions is its main objective. This question and the catalogue 
on competencies exemplify the explicit federal linkage implicit today in the European 
Union. 
In referring to the necessary simplification of the treaties and the Communities’ 
legal instruments, the Convention specifically mentions the possibility of reorganizing 
them, dividing them into set and flexible parts, and incorporating the Bill of Rights. It 
also refers to the possibility of this reorganisation representing the first step towards 
adopting a Constitution, the nature and basic contents of which would be subject to 
further analysis. 
The European Parliament, the Commission, several politicians, academia and civil 
society organizations have applauded the idea of a Constitution for the European Union 
ever since Fischer raised this subject for the first time in the spring of 2000. It is rather 
striking that, although the word federalism or federation is still shunned in the European 
construction process and flatly rejected by many governments, the idea of a Constitution 
is gradually taking root even though it implies much more, since there is nothing more 
federal than a Constitution. A federation without a Constitution is possible, but we cannot 
imagine a Constitution in the European construction process without, at least, some form 
of federation.
13 
The European Council meeting in Laeken finally opted for the Convention 
method for preparing the Intergovernmental Conference. This method is a federal one in 
some respects since the different legitimacies in the European construction are given 
equal footing. The European Parliament and pro-European sectors generally insisted on 
applying the Convention method again because of the excellent results achieved in 
drafting the European Union’s Bill of Rights.
14  This Convention system is reminiscent of 
the methods rejected at the start of the process in the 1948 Hague Congress, the so-called 
constitutional method vs. the method proposed by the functionalists.
15  Its application at 
that time would have been premature but, nowadays, the change in the objective 
conditions makes its application possible. 
The Convention method supersedes the diplomatic reform methods since, for the 
first time in European history, a democratic entity, which embodies the European Union’s 
double legitimacy —national and European— is entrusted with the preparation of an 
Intergovernmental Conference, probably inaugurating the federal method and 
superseding the community method, even sidelining the intergovernmental method in the 
reform process. 
                                                           
13 This is the case, at least from our point of view, given that the different member states’ political and legal 
cultures attach different meanings to concepts such as constitution and federation. 
14 See the European Parliament’s Resolution on the Treaty of Nice, 31 May 2001, op. cit. 
15 In The Hague, the convinced federalist, Paul Reynaud’s proposal for the election, of a European 
Constituent Assembly through universal suffrage with one representative per one million inhabitants 
caused quite a stir. The final support for this initiative was minimal since it was considered premature and 
unfeasible. See: Dusan Sidjanski, Europe’s Federalist Future: From the European Community to the 
European Union, Barcelona: Ariel, 1998, p. 24. 
  9 One of the Declaration of Laeken’s major contributions is the formalisation of an 
open civil society forum, which, through its informal involvement, contributed to the 
excellent results achieved in drafting the Bill. This will certainly result in a more open 
and democratic Europe. The overall assessment is that Laeken represents a significant 
milestone in the construction of Europe, reflecting novel constitutional issues in this 
respect and the willingness to deepen, making decisive progress towards the Constitution 
and the European Federation. 
 
The Reasons behind the Qualitative Change in the Debate 
 
The Treaty of Nice represents the end of the Union model as it emerged from the 
Maastricht European Council and the start of a new phase, the constituent process 
towards a constitutional treaty based on the Laeken Declaration. This political context 
links the end of a phase with the beginning of a new one and establishes the necessary 
linkage between both phases. The deepening phase of the European model through 
minimal reforms is the start of another phase involving the constituent process, the 
reform of the political and legal foundations through a global and core debate, the 
relationship among the supporting powers and a phase that will have an impact on the 
core of European construction.
16 
Considering the aforementioned, how have such profound changes been possible 
in such a short period? A few months ago, I synthesised the structural aspects that 
warranted a constitutional debate, and the reason for adopting Declarations, such as 
Number 23 and Laeken. I would like to add one more.
17 
1. The exhaustion of the Community’s method of small steps and the insufficiency 
of the institutional system: The European Union model of small steps exhibits 
dysfunctions and limitations because it is a tired model that needs to be reformed. We 
refer both to the institutional system as a whole as well as the specific functioning of 
some institutions, which were originally designed for a sectoral Community of six 
member states and which are no longer appropriate for a political twenty-eight member 
state Union.
18  Thanks to the growing success of European integration, the Community 
method envisaged by the treaties has become obsolete. The Union comprises now a group 
of horizontal and vertical political relationships, with more in common, with a multi-level 
federal system than with a sectoral international organization, such as what the European 
Community used to be. The recognition of this new reality is the framework for the 
                                                           
16 See Francisco Aldecoa Luzarraga, "The Treaty of Nice,” Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, No. 25, 2001, 
pp. 11-54. 
17 See Francisco Aldecoa Luzarraga, European Integration. Análisis histórico-institucional con textos y 
documentos. Vol. II. The European Union’s Genesis and Development (1979-2002), op. cit., pp. 431-437. 
18 With respect to the institutional system’s inadequacies and the need for an in-depth reform, see: J-V. 
Louis, "La réforme des institutions de l'Union européenne. Schéma pour une réflexion," Revue du Marché 
commun et de l'Union Européenne, Nº 443, December 2000, pp. 681-685; J-L. Quermonne, "Observations 
sur la réforme des institutions," Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, nº 443, December, 
pp. 686-689. 
  10  initiatives running parallel to the constitutional debate, such as the debate launched by the 
European Commission in its White Book on European Governance aimed at 
strengthening democracy in this new reality.
19 
2. The inadequacy of the diplomatic reform method: More precisely, the reform 
method based on an Intergovernmental Conference requiring the consensus of all 
member states, is no longer adequate for the new situation. According to the European 
Parliament, this system only allows agreements based on the minimum common 
denominator.  We have seen five treaty reforms in the last sixteen years, each with a 
narrower scope and difficulty in the ratification process. At the same time, with reforms 
being stepped up, the validity of these treaties is increasingly shorter and becoming 
obsolete soon after enforcement. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was ratified in one of the most non-
controversial processes in recent years, was enforced on May 1, 1999, and one and a half 
months later, the Cologne European Council called for an Intergovernmental Conference 
for reforming the Treaty. If, as expected, the Treaty of Nice becomes effective on January 
1, 2003, the Amsterdam Treaty would have been in effect for three and a half years. If, as 
expected, the current reform is approved in December 2003 and enforced in 2005, the 
Treaty of Nice would have been in effect for only two years. 
3. The imminent enlargement: The enlargement process expedites the new 
transformation since the future Union will have twice the number of members and will be 
constantly immersed in an enlargement project. A challenge as significant as the 2004 
enlargement cannot be carried out without a parallel deepening process, one as significant 
as the design of a new European political order. The 25-member Europe of 2004 requires 
a qualitative overhaul of the institutional system and policies since, the number of 
candidates, as well as their heterogeneity and the differences among member states place 
the European construction in the dilemma of having to choose between greater deepening 
and dilution. 
At this stage of the European integration, we find a different type of undertaking. 
The European Union’s prior goal was sectoral integration. The task at hand is the 
peaceful unification of Europe through shared sovereignty at the lower as well as higher 
political levels. The means or resources cannot be the same. The imminent enlargement 
calls for immediate political decisions for laying the foundations for the new system as 
soon as possible without any further delays, since this would be more difficult to carry 
out at a later stage when new and more heterogeneous members have been accepted. 
4. Today’s international globalised society with its opportunities and risks: The 
international scenario that the European Union faces is radically different from the 
scenario of the last decade, with September 11
th as a manifestation of the challenges and 
risks inherent in international globalised society. The Union must have a mode of 
government that enables it not only to enjoy a significant presence in the world, but also 
                                                           
19 The European Commission’s White Book of European Governance presented on 25 July 2001 (COM 
(2001) 0428 final).  
 
  11  to shoulder its responsibilities in the international arena and strengthen its model as an 
alternative to the globalisation of international society. 
The escalation of international terrorism on the wake of September 11
th had a 
considerable impact on hastening the deepening process for the federal model as 
recognised by the Heads of State and Government in the Laeken Declaration. The fifteen 
members concurrently expressed their willingness to enhance the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’s foundation, resources, and instruments, especially in their joint fight 
against terrorism. In a certain way, this manifestation of the new twenty-first century 
threats is a catalyst in the European Constitution ratification process. 
5. The attainment of the Economic and Monetary Union and its impact towards 
federation: The euro represents the end of another stage in the European construction 
process and, as its predecessor, the internal market, creates the material conditions that 
enable and demand a political deepening of great importance. The Monetary Union calls 
for greater coordination of policies and political deepening and, hence, for the creation of 
a European economic government that would optimise its results. 
The success of the euro currently in circulation and civil society’s resounding 
backing of its implementation is, to a large extent, the result of its support not only for the 
economic but also for the political European construction process since the currency is 
the first expression of a federal model that is beginning to demand a federalist method. 
This is why it has been said that the euro has an inherent federalist effect. Because of the 
mechanisms involved in the successive phases in the European construction process, the 
attainment of an Economic and Monetary Union demands new objectives and calls for 
“more Europe”. 
6. The problem of “political legitimacy” as perceived by the citizens: There is no 
lack of democracy in the current state of European construction. It suffers, rather, from a 
“shortfall of information”, the difficulty in raising citizens’ awareness with respect to the 
contents of the European venture and of providing a clear explanation on institutional 
workings. European institutions and governments today are fully aware that for European 
construction to survive, it must be brought closer to the citizens, encouraging them to 
support and identify with the project. 
It is imperative to overcome the traditional approach in which Community matters 
were the exclusive domain of governments and experts. In the current state, besides 
activities of a general political nature, the Union is decisively moving towards a federal 
model. The method selected by Declaration 23 responds to the demand to reach out to 
citizens’ through a debate open to all European citizens, and to the specific objective of 
simplifying the Treaties to make them more comprehensible to citizens. In this sense, the 
basic demand of civil society associations is to achieve “more” Europe based on more 
political legitimacy, that is, a federal method, since it begins at the bottom and moves 
towards the top: civil society, cities, regions, states and the European Parliament. 
Nevertheless, besides these construction factors, inherent in European 
construction today, I would add some contingent aspects or factors that have come up in 
recent months that also seem to be having an impact on the outcome of this debate: 
  12  1.- The rift with the United States in the aftermath of September 11
th because of 
the militarisation of its foreign policy, an approach not shared by most Europeans. 
Furthermore, the dissimilarities are also attributable to the differences in the values, 
interests, and world vision of both blocks increasingly more evident. The rift with the 
United States requires “more Europe” and offers an opportunity for developing an 
autonomous foreign policy. 
2.- The renewal of the Franco-German alliance in the recent Summit in Brussels 
on October 25-26, 2002, decisive for adopting financial decisions for the acceptance of 
ten new member states in January 2004. President Chirac announced a bilateral 
agreement whereby this alliance agreed to play a leading role in the deepening process to 
help ensure the success of the constitutional treaty. 
3.- This sparked a confrontation between Chirac and Blair that has led to a 
cooling of bilateral relationships between France and the United Kingdom. This 
encounter may also have an unexpected impact on the ratification of the future 
constitutional treaty: the adoption of a constitutional two-speed approach that would not 
change the course of the project or its postponement. 
All these factors are behind the ratification of Declaration 23
20 and imply, not 
only adapting the European Union to the new circumstances, but also —similarly to the 
European Community in the mid-eighties— redefining the European integration system’s 
constitutional or base model while respecting the acquis of what has been achieved to 
date. The present challenge is to reach a consensus on a European political integration 
model that, while reflecting and preserving previous experiences and breakthroughs, lays 
the new foundations to enable the European Union —which is increasingly “more 
Europe”— to respond to the needs it must face. 
 
The Novelties of the Convention’s Method 
 
In response to political and social pressures, the Laeken Declaration entrusted the task of 
preparing the Intergovernmental Conference planned for 2004 to a Convention. There 
have been two previous Conventions in the history of European construction: the most 
well-known, similar to the above, drafted the European Union’s Bill of Rights in 2000. 
Nevertheless, a body of national parliamentarians and members of the European 
Parliament meeting in Rome in 1991 to collaborate in the work of the Intergovernmental 
Conferences that were negotiating the Treaty of Maastricht, is somewhat reminiscent of 
this Convention since it is was the first time that nationally elected and European 
representatives participated in preparing a reform.
21 
                                                           
20 Declaration 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice programs the reform of the treaties by means of an 
Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. Nevertheless, it has been decided to hold this Intergovernmental 
Conference in the second quarter of 2003 and that the new treaty should be completed in Rome in 
December 2003. 
21 EUROPEUM, “Method of the Convention on the Future of Europe,” European Policy Forum, 2002, in: 
http://www.euractiv.com 
  13  The Declaration of Laeken governs the Convention’s composition, which includes 
105 nominal members plus alternate members. It reflects the two legitimacies present in 
the European construction: national and common institutions. With respect to the 
common institutions, the European Convention includes seventeen European Parliament 
representatives and two Commission members. Each of the member and candidate states 
has sent two representatives from their national parliaments and one representative from 
the Head of State or Government. The Convention is working on the logical post-
enlargement phase with candidate states expected to participate in the deliberations with 
the same number of representatives as the member states, without however, being able to 
prevent any consensus. 
The European Council appointed the former French President, Giscard d’Estaing 
as Chairman, and two Vice-Chairmen, ex-Foreign Ministers Dehaene and Amato.
22  
These appointments have been quite controversial, not just because of the persons who 
were chosen, but also because it is common practice for all Assemblies to designate its 
leaders from among its members —similarly to the Convention that drafted the Bill of 
Fundamental Rights— without accepting any interference from powers that have not 
been party to the Assemblies. Although those who espoused the most federalist stances 
were not initially pleased with Giscard’s appointment, the opposite holds true today and 
there are well-founded reasons to believe that he will do his best to ensure the success of 
the Convention.  He seems committed, wishing to “go down in history”,
23 to attaining the 
goal of drafting a constitution. 
In addition to the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention contemplates a 
9-member Praesidium —made up of representatives of the European Union holding the 
Council Presidencies, the national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission
24  — to supervise the work of the Convention. Moreover, the Declaration 
designates the role of observers to representatives of the Economic and Social 
Committee, the Regional Committee and the European Ombudsman. The participation of 
the Civil Society Forum in the work of the Convention through regular information on its 
work and the Forum’s contribution to debates is another constitutional construction 
innovation. This is a recognition of the important role played by civil society in political 
                                                           
22 Giscard was appointed at the suggestion of the French President and approved by consensus, which leads 
to the question of whether there might not be some sort of tacit agreement between France and Germany, 
the two major countries, to preside over all the Convention, although Herzog, the Chairman of the 
Convention was appointed by this body. 
23 In this sense, it seems striking that Giscard, in an interview in Le Monde on 10 January 2002, compared 
himself explicitly to General GeorgeWashington, who presided over the Philadelphia Convention that 
drafted the Constitution of the United States of America. In fact, in opinion and scientific analysis articles, 
parallelisms with the Philadelphia constituent convention are quite common, situations that, in our opinion, 
are not comparable in any way. 
24 The Laeken Declaration calls for the constitution of a Convention Secretariat to assist the Praesidium in 
technical tasks and in legal drafts. Although the appointment of its secretary is not reflected in the 
Declaration, we believe it is of great political relevance and can have been agreed upon only at the highest 
level. Sir John Kerr, a former Permanent Representative from the United Kingdom and an eminent member 
of the Foreign Office was appointed to this post. His appointment could be interpreted as an important 
political advantage in the United Kingdom’s favour for exerting its influence on the final document. 
 
  14  life and, together with citizens’ online contribution through the internet, has proven to be 
a very productive formula for democratic involvement in the debate. 
The Convention’s mandate in the Declaration of Laeken is to consider the issues 
and draw up “a final document that may comprise either of the different options, 
indicating the degree of support they received, or recommendations if consensus is 
achieved”. The Intergovernmental Conference, however, has the final voice and will 
adopt the final decision. The Convention’s mandate, therefore, would only involve acting 
as a reflection group in preparing the Intergovernmental Conference. As inferred from the 
previously mentioned text, the simplification of the treaties does not necessarily have to 
lead to the drafting of a constitution. The question is: “What might the basic features of 
such a Constitution be? What are the values cherished by the Union?” In any event, for 
greater clarity and to dispel any doubts, the epigraph is entitled “The Constitutional road 
for European Citizens”. 
It seems crystal clear that a consensus on a single legal text is the Convention’s 
only chance of being considered in the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference. Given 
its legitimacy, it would seem that, just as in the case of the Bill of Rights, the Heads of 
State and Government will not have any other choice but to accept or reject it without the 
possibility of debating its contents. 
The Convention’s methods offer three innovations: its composition vis-à-vis the 
traditional Intergovernmental Conference of member state diplomats, its nature, and its 
work method. The Convention relies on broader and more pluralistic participation: it 
includes representatives from European institutions and current and future members as 
well as representatives from civil society, regions, and local groups. 
This composition undoubtedly reflects a change in the nature –the 
transformation– that European construction has undergone: it has evolved from an 
economic-type international organization to a multi-level political organization that has a 
direct impact in the citizens’ day-to-day lives, and therefore, its reform cannot be 
negotiated except by its direct representatives. 
The reform’s work method has evolved, from the diplomatic negotiations 
requiring the unanimity of all the member states, into a Convention that will adopt the 
constitutional treaty proposal by consensus, without in principle, requiring a voted. The 
difference between unanimity and consensus is very relevant, particularly when a new 
political framework for coexistence is at stake. The Convention has the unquestionable 
virtue of taking a new road for overcoming these classical confrontations and exploring 
the points in common to see if it is able to agree on a common global project. 
 
The European Convention: A Hybrid between an Intergovernmental Conference 
and a Constituent Parliament 
 
After eight months of functioning, what would be the best description for the European 
Convention: an Intergovernmental Conference in disguise, or a camouflaged constituent 
  15  Parliament? At present, it seems to be a hybrid between a parliament, since it represents 
two legitimacies that reflect the shared European sovereignty, and an Intergovernmental 
Conference in as much as government members, the players in an Intergovernmental 
Conference, are directly involved. 
In his introductory speech to the European Convention on February 28, 2002, the 
Chairman, Mr. Giscard d’Estaing, defined the Convention as “a group of women and men 
meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal”, stressing that it was neither 
an Intergovernmental Conference nor a parliament. He believes that the goal is to foster a 
“Convention spirit” the mission of which he summarised as being, “Outwards to listen - 
inwards to make proposal”.  A consensus, the “door towards a European Constitution” 
would only be possible insofar as it is able to foster such a spirit.
25 
The adoption by the Convention of rules on its work methods has resulted in 
significant changes to the original Laeken Declaration design of said Convention, the 
fruit of the requests and contributions by the Convention representatives, particularly by 
members of the European Parliament.
26  An “invited member” can represent the 
candidate countries in the Praesidium and the question of alternates was clarified. This 
has, in fact, modified the Convention’s composition that effectively has 230 members.
27 
Following the example of the Convention for the Bill of Rights, the European Convention 
has gone further than the Laeken restriction (“the members of the Convention may only 
be replaced by alternate members if they are not present”) enabling the participation of 
alternates, even their right to address the Convention and be included in the working 
groups, practically with the same conditions as the members. 
It is important to highlight that the Convention representatives are generally 
leading politicians in their respective countries or in the European political scene, giving 
us an idea of the expectations that the Convention has awakened from the start. Among 
these, several acting ministers such as the British Minister Peter Hain, the French 
Minister Pierre Moscovici, the Belgian Minister Louis Michel or the Italian Minister 
Gianfranco Fini who were appointed by their respective Heads of Government. 
The Convention includes several European politicians with long experience and a 
broad understanding of the workings of Europe, such as the Chairman, Giscard d’Estaing 
and the Vice-Chairmen, Dehaene and Amato, the representatives from Luxembourg, 
Jacques Santer, (former Chairman of the Commission), the ex-Chairman of the European 
Parliament, Klaus Hänsch, the Irish MacSharry, (former commissioner involved in the 
agricultural reform which bears his name), Henning Christophersen from Denmark, who 
besides serving several times as Minister in his country, was also Vice-Chairman of the 
European Commission, and the Commissioners Michel Barnier and António Vitorino. 
                                                           
25 Introductory speech by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Chairman of the European Convention, 28 February 
2002, SN 1565/02, in: http://www.european-convention.eu.int. 
26 Jaume Duch I Guillot, “The Workings of the European Convention,” Seminar organized by the Spanish 
Association of Parliamentary Lawyers, Tenerife, 19 September 2002, pending publication. 
27 Some of the Convention members have pointed out the Euro-sceptics’ limited representation in the 
Convention, mainly because in most member states, this current is not reflected by the party in government 
or by the majority opposition parties, the ones involved in the Convention. 
  16  The strong personalities of other European parliamentarians are also worth 
mentioning, such as Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, 
Alain Lamassoure, former French minister for European Affairs, the Spaniard, Inigo 
Méndez de Vigo, a speaker on the most recent European Parliament resolutions on 
constitutional matters, and Andrew Duff, the Chairman of the Group of Democrats and 
Reformists. 
Because of the manner in which they were appointed, as well as the work 
methods,
28 Chairman Giscard d’Estaing grouped the Convention representatives 
according to three different currents of opinion or three different perceptions. First, the 
“Brussels” current, comprising representatives of the common institutions, Parliament 
and the Commission, based in Brussels, who have an in-depth knowledge of the system 
and are generally involved in questions concerning institutional reform. 
Second, is the group comprising national parliament representatives, a very 
heterogeneous majority. Some lack European experience and, because of their diverse 
backgrounds, it has been difficult to integrate them into the Convention’s working 
methods. And, finally, the group of government representatives in which there may be 
some ambiguity since it may be difficult to know if they speak their own views —which 
they should, as Convention representatives— or act as spokesmen for the governments 
they represent. This group, by providing the important interconnection between the 
Convention and member states, ensures that the proposals can be assumed and accepted 
by the Intergovernmental Conference, which must approve the text adopted by the 
Convention. 
As the work of the Convention advances, governments seem to be realising that 
the stakes are very high. This explains the trend of appointing strong government 
personalities, such as Ana de Palacio, Spain’s Foreign Minister, and member of the 
Praesidium, and the incorporation of the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, as a 
representative of his government.
29  It may be worth asking if this trend will intensify and 
if an anticipated Intergovernmental Conference will be sitting at the Convention.
30 
                                                           
28 Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, “The latest news on the European Convention,” El País, 22 July 2002. 
29 Including these, there are close to a dozen current members of their governments who have a seat in the 
Convention.  
30 Furthermore, some accuse Chairman Giscard of presiding over “two Conventions” at the same time, that 
is, of being permanently in touch with the Heads of State and Government, exploring their concerns with 
respect to each aspect of the Convention’s debate and acting as an intermediary between both groups.   
  17  From another perspective, the formation of political groups in the Convention 
representing the major trans-European political parties —the Popular, Socialists, 
Democrats, and Reformists— is becoming evident, with these groups showing some 
organization and coherence and, in certain cases, making agreed upon political 
contributions.
31 The Convention will not be similar to a parliament because these groups 
are not divided into majority or minority and the goal is to reach consensus, with no 
voting involved. Nevertheless, the role of political groups will be crucial in trying to 
reach and negotiate a consensus on the final text. 
The tasks of the Convention have been divided into three well-differentiated 
phases. The first hearings phase took place between March and June 2002, and aimed at 
defining the issues to be addressed by the Convention through debates between the 
Convention members, civil society and the Youth Convention.
32 The first agreements 
have emerged from the results of these plenary sessions and an initial approximation was 
made on the issues that should be analysed with the working groups being set up for this 
purpose carrying out their work in the second phase.
33  It was also decided to create eight 
contact groups that would meet periodically with the Convention for structured 
consultations with the Civil Society Forum.
34 
We are currently in the analysis phase, which began last September, in which the 
Working Groups will be playing the leading role. These groups are chaired by a 
Praesidium member and comprise a maximum number of 30 representatives with no 
distinction made between full or alternate members. The groups meet periodically to 
study the various issues included in their mandate and, on certain occasions, listen to 
experts on the subject. The plenary continues to meet in full sessions, with the progress 
made by the different groups put forward and debated. This will all culminate with the 
draft phase. 
                                                           
31 In this sense, the following contributions by European Socialists to the Convention are worth mentioning: 
“The Socialists’ European Project: the new federalism” (CONV 63/02) and “The European Socialists’ 
Essential Proposals” (CONV 182/02). The European Socialist Party’s members in the Convention held a 
seminar on August 30-31, 2002, that led to a draft of their first political document “Europe’s Priorities” 
presented on October 3, 2002, and available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum. The European 
Socialist Party, following a round of discussions, also presented their proposal for the Construction of 
Europe in October (CONV 325/02). Andrew Duff, the Chairman of the European Parliament for the 
Democrats and Reformists Group, also presented his group’s proposal for a Constitution: “A Constitutional 
Model for a Federal European Union” (CONV 234/02). 
32 Six plenary sessions where held during this phase on the Convention representatives’ expectations on the 
Union (21-22 March); the EU missions (15-16 April; the EU carrying out its missions; efficiency and 
legitimacy (23-24 May); an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the role of national parliaments (6-7 
June); civil society hearing (24-25 June) and foreign action and the Youth Convention’s hearing (11-12 
July). 
33 Ten working groups have been set up: six on May 17, 2002, the so-called first batch groups, on the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Bill of Fundamental Rights, the Union’s legal personality, the role of national 
parliaments, complementary competencies and economic governance. Subsequently, the establishment of 
four additional groups, the second batch, was approved on September 12-13, 2002, entrusted with the study 
on foreign action, defence, simplification of legal procedures and instruments, and Security and Justice. 
34 The eight contact groups with civil society are divided according to their spheres of action: social sector, 
environment, academia and reflection circles, citizens and institutions, regions and local entities, human 
rights, development and culture. 
 
  18  The Convention is a hybrid between an Intergovernmental Conference and a 
constituent parliament, and it is precisely in this hybrid nature where its chances of 
success ultimately lie. Insofar as the Intergovernmental Conference is within the 
Convention’s bosom, it will not be able to diverge from what has been agreed. The 
constituent representative assembly method ensures its democratic legitimacy and the 
possibility of breaking deadlocks in the debates. It is logical to expect that thanks to its 
hybrid character, the results will reflect the model’s dual character, and include federalist 
as well as intergovernmental elements. 
 
A Skeleton Treaty with a Federalist Slant: Initial Agreements and Unresolved 
Differences 
 
The press was surprised by the news that the so-called "skeleton" Treaty for a European 
Constitution was presented before the plenary session on October 28, 2002. The Draft 
Treaty, based on Group agreements with regard to legal personality, assumes the same 
format as the Constitutional Treaty. That is, it contains an empty framework that will 
have to be filled in with the agreements that may be reached on the projects of various 
Groups and the final debate on the institutional framework. The main novelty is that a 
federal format gains ground. The Chairman believes that the first complete version, 
expected to be ready by the first quarter of 2003, may be negotiated and restructured until 
deciding on an agreed text by the following summer. 
Thus far, five of the Groups have completed their projects on: the principle of 
subsidiarity, the simplification of the treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
economic governance, and national parliaments. Some of them have presented their 
conclusions before the plenary session, after the debate on which both initial agreements 
and lines of division at the convention were delineated. The first plenary session at which 
the results of the work of some of the Groups, namely those on legal personality and 
subsidiarity, were debated was held on October 3-4, 2002. The Chairman stated that "the 
recommendations made by the Groups would serve as the basic elements on which the 
final product would subsequently be built."
35 
To start, the Group's recommendations with regard to the legal personality were 
presented and adopted by a consensus. This was followed by a general debate in which it 
became clear that there was wide agreement at the Convention that a legal personality 
should be specifically approved in the new treaty -a single personality to replace those of 
currently existing organisations-. Merging personalities should be a step toward putting 
the treaties together in a single text, which could contain two parts, where the main 
section would contain the provisions of a constitutional nature. Lastly, the overwhelming 
majority of the Convention participants spoke out in favour of joining the pillars that 
currently exist, which would not necessary preclude the continued use of special 
procedures for some matters. 
                                                           
35 Abridged report on October 3-4, 2002, plenary session (CONV 331/02). 
 
  19  Later on in the same session, a debate was held on the Final Report prepared by 
the Group on the principle of subsidiarity, presented by its Chairman, Mr. Méndez de 
Vigo, of Spain. In this case, the debate at the Convention was significantly more heated 
than in the previous case, and brought to light not only wide areas of agreement, but 
deep-seeded differences in areas they suggested require further reflection. It was agreed 
that the principle of subsidiarity would be taken into greater account. There is a general 
agreement on introducing improvements on its application by European institutions and 
its control; improvements that should in no way hinder the legislative process. This is 
also a general agreement with respect to the need for the Commission to strengthen its 
legislative proposal by providing detailed information on the principle of subsidiarity, 
including the financial and legal implications for member states. 
With respect to the procedures for controlling the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, it is widely agreed that it should be of a political nature, with an opportunity 
for jurisdictional control at the end of the procedure. Many of the Convention participants 
approve of the Group's proposal to involve the national parliaments in the prior political 
control using an early alert system, developed during the beginning stages of the 
Commission. However, there is significant disagreement with respect to the technical 
aspects of said system. 
The conclusions of the Working Groups on the Charter, national parliaments, and 
economic governance, which were presented to the Convention over the duration of the 
plenary session of October 28-29, 2002, were made public the final week of October. The 
final report on the session has not yet been received. 
The Draft of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” is divided into 
three sections, to which, as has been seen, one more is added in response to the Group's 
recommendation. The first one, of a constitutional nature, would provide the definition 
and objectives of the European Union, the citizens of the European Union and their 
fundamental rights, a separation of competencies and the principles under which they are 
exercised, the institutional framework, the budget, the means of taking action abroad and 
the conditions for belonging to the European Union. The second section, of lesser 
importance and with greater flexibility, would contain the regulations for specific policies 
such as matters regarding institutional operations and procedures. Lastly, it would include 
a third section with technical regulations of a legal nature relating to the scope of 
application of the treaty, the process for making revisions, ratification, etc. 
Little can be gathered from such a bare framework, although it appears to serve as 
a federal Constitution since it states that common policies are managed according to a 
federal formula, and one could even believe that it contains the model for a Federation of 
nation-states. That is, a principle which receives support in some of the proposals put 
forth by Giscard himself, which would have to be debated by the Convention, such as the 
large amount of attention given to the issue of European Union citizenship, the proposal 
to rename the Union depending on the emergence of a new political reality, or the 
creation of a Parliament of the Peoples of Europe. In any event, what is clear is that it is 
more of a Constitution than a treaty. 
  20  The Draft Treaty has spurred two types of conflicting reactions. It seems to have 
been well-received by some of the groups of "Euro-sceptics" such as the British Tories 
and some Scandinavians, such as the Deputy Minister of Sweden, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, 
and the Danish Member of Parliament, Jens-Peter Bonde. On the other hand, the 
federalists believe that it contains a basis for hope, whereby good "filling" on which to 
build a federal organization for Europe could be introduced. 
At this stage in the work of the Convention, we might ask ourselves to what 
extent have the terms of the debate on the future of Europe changed due to the dynamics 
of the Convention. It might be considered the typical tension between those who support 
a stronger federalist line and intergovernmentalists, pro-Europeans, and Euro-sceptics, 
which has not changed. This tension was exemplified during some of the debates at the 
Convention by the extreme opposing position of Peter Hain, former representative of the 
British government, and Peter Glotz, Germany's representative until recently.
36 
At present, the debates that invoke the strongest disagreements are those that arise 
between federalists and intergovernmentalists in reference to the institutional framework 
and reforming a common foreign policy. The extreme position of the federalists can be 
observed in the contributions to the Convention of the Parliament and the European 
Commission, which partly overlap, that basically demand, on one hand, that the European 
Commission be made stronger and that its Chairman, in particular, must attain greater 
democratic legitimacy by being elected by the European Parliament. 
On the other hand, Blair and Chirac submitted a proposal to have the European 
Council appoint a President of the European Union from among former Heads of State 
and Government, to set the course of the Union over a four-year term. This initiative 
received the support of four of the major member states: the United Kingdom, Italy, 
France, and Spain. However, it has resulted in mistrust on the part of all of the small and 
medium sized nations who fear they will be marginalized. These nations, as well as 
Germany, support the proposal to strengthen the position of Chairman of the 
Commission, who would also have direct democratic legitimacy. It is very difficult to 
reconcile these two proposals. 
Nevertheless, there is no question that positions have become more flexible in the 
course of the Convention. The clearest example of this is the statement by the British 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, on the desirability of providing the European 
Union with a Constitution, which was unthinkable just a few months ago. However, the 
tension that existed when the European construction commenced is still present, albeit the 
positions are not as extreme. The final agreement may represent a combination of 
federalism and intergovernmentalism, which at the same time reflects yet another 
characteristic of the Europe under construction -finding middle ground on which to 
continue. A different perspective is that of Lamassoure who requests that the two 
Constitutional Treaties and the Charter be written in such a way that each state is able to 
                                                           
36 Peter Hain and Peter Glotz are not currently members of the Convention.  After the British Government’s 
restructuring, the former was replaced by MacShane, defined by the press as a Europhile. Peter Glotz was 
replaced by Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.  An example of the opposition of 
both extremes can be seen in the minutes of the July 11, 2002, plenary session on action abroad, which can 
be obtained from: http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004 
  21  choose whether to sign one or the other according to whether it is generally prepared to 
take steps toward a federation. This would basically involve establishing cooperation 
with support at a constitutional level.
37 
At this time, another tension, not unfamiliar in the formation of Europe, seems to 
have emerged at the Convention: the division between those who support a liberal Europe 
and others who advocate a social Europe. In this respect, a motion was presented on the 
need for a study examining the social objectives in the Constitutional Treaty, through 
debates in plenary sessions and the creation of a special Working Group.
38 The plenary 
session held on October 3-4, 2002, decided that, given the fact that the Groups on the 
Charter and economic governance already deal with this matter, the November 7, 2002, 
debate on economic governance would be extended to include a Socialist Europe and 
take action in light of this debate.
39 
 
Foreign Policy in the Debate on the Future of Europe 
 
The question of Europe's role in the world has been an issue since the onset of the debate 
on the future and the purpose of Europe. On this issue, Chirac asserts that “...Europe, the 
power to which we appeal, this strong Europe in the international scene must have strong 
institutions and an effective and legitimate means for making decisions, that is, by taking 
all of its work up for a majority vote and reflecting the relative weight of each of its 
Member States.”
40 
Although Declaration 23 does not include reforms on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy objectives, means and instruments in its list of matters to consider, "the 
new role of Europe in a global environment" occupies an important place in the Laeken 
Declaration. It raises the issue of strengthening the presence of the European Union in the 
international realm of globalisation with the challenge to change the world: “Europe has 
been living in peace for over half a century. Together with North America and Japan, it is 
one of the three most prosperous regions in the world. (...) What is Europe's role in this 
changed world? Shouldn't Europe, finally unified, perform the function of leader in a new 
world order, one that is at the same time a power with the ability to serve as a stabilizer 
on a global level and to guide numerous countries and peoples?” 
Europe's responsibility in the face of globalisation stems from the need for 
reforms in its Common Foreign Policy, in the areas where it has not been sufficiently 
revealed.
41 While bearing in mind the questions posed by Laeken, the European 
                                                           
37 Alain Lamassoure, “Une Constitution pour l’Europe,” The European Policy Centre, 6 June 2002, in: 
http://www.theepc.be  
38 Motion presented by Ms. Anne Van Lancker, Mr. Johannes Voggenhuber and Ms. Sylvia-Yvonne 
Kaufman and other Convention members, 26 September 2002 (CONV 300/02). 
39 Abridged report on the 3 and 4 October 2002 plenary session, (CONV 331/02). 
40 Jacques CHIRAC, “Our Europe”, Speech before the Bundestag, 27 July 2000, op. cit. 
41 Toulemon believes that the required unanimity in decision-making and the lack of a body responsible for 
defining, promoting and representing the common European interests is at the root of the CFSP’s 
weaknesses. See:  R. Toulemon, “De l’Europe Economique à l’Europe Politique par la Méthode 
  22  Parliament recently passed in May 2002 its contribution to the European Convention in 
the area of the distribution of competencies.
42  In addition to a request for assigning the 
second and third pillars to the Community for reinforcing democratic legitimacy and 
ensuring parliamentary and jurisdictional control, this Resolution contains a request to 
assign competence over Foreign Policy and the common defence to the Union. 
Similarly, the Euro-Congress requires the Union to have a legal personality and 
calls for the creation of diplomatic posts to represent the European Union in non-member 
countries in which at least four member states have diplomatic missions, with a view 
toward the gradual creation of full diplomacy of the European Union.
43  It believes that 
the responsibilities of the High Representative for the CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) and the Commissioner of Foreign Relations should be assumed by a sole 
Vice-Chairman of the Commission responsible for Foreign Relations. A diplomatic corps 
should be created for the European Union in the area of the European Commission that 
would fall under the responsibility of the Vice-Chairman of Foreign Relations. 
The European Commission approved the first of its contributions to the work of 
the Convention on May 22, 2002. In it, they stated their opinion that “the Union must 
exercise its responsibilities as a world power; assert itself according to its own values as a 
participant in globalisation, with a model for development that is solidarity and 
sustainable; pave the way for a foreign policy that is open to dialogue among 
civilisations, cultures and religions based on cooperation with the countries which border 
it and the will to bring together the North and the South.”
44  
The Commission, like the Parliament, has proposed that the positions of High 
Representative of the CFSP and Commissioner of Foreign Relations be merged into one. 
This position would receive policy initiatives, control over crisis management and sole 
responsibility for representation in foreign affairs. Foreign policy needs to be equipped 
with the necessary means -budget allocations, specially designed procedures, a network 
of foreign delegations. The Commission advocates requiring a qualified majority in order 
to adopt foreign policy decisions, with the exception of those involving defence policies. 
In short, integrating the High Representative into the Commission is a way of requesting 
that foreign policy is considered a matter for the Community. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Communautaire,” Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne, no. 457, April 2002, p. 217. For 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the CFSP’s insufficiencies would be solved by qualified majority decisions, the 
establishment of a Council specialising in foreign policies, the improvement of the European machinery for 
preparing and executing decisions, political continuity and the merger of the High Representative for the 
CFSP and the Commissioner for Foreign Relations functions.  See: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “Making 
Foreign Policy  More Effective,” International Policy Analysis Unit, Working Group on European 
Integration, Working Paper no. 12, May 2002, in: http://www.fes.de/indexipa.html. 
42 European Parliament Resolution of 16 May 2002 on the delimitation of competencies between the 
European Union and the member states (A5-0133/2002) based on the Lamassoure Report, in: 
http://europarl.eu.int 
43 See Francisco Aldecoa Luzarraga, “La coordinación de la formación en materia comunitaria de los 
cuerpos diplomáticos de los estados miembros”, ICEI, 2002, pending publication, which analyses the issue 
of a common European diplomacy. 
44 Commission des Communautés Européennes, Communication de la Commission “Un projet pour 
l’Union Européenne”, 22.05.2002,  COM (2002) 247 final. 
  23  In spite of the federalist demands of the Parliament and the European 
Commission, the work that has been performed at the Convention until now offers no 
grounds for alleging that either one of the institutions' demands will be answered. In this 
area, it is only natural that the unwillingness of the member states to give up 
competencies is much greater than in other cases, as symbolised paradigmatically in the 
participation of the British government representative, Peter Hain.
45 Given the 
importance of the matter, a Working Group has been created and entrusted with studying 
the reforms applicable to actions abroad. Said Group, which is presided over by Vice- 
Chairman Dehaene, has not yet finished its work. 
Notwithstanding, conclusions reached by other groups that achieved consensus of 
the convention participants, such as the need to assign a single legal personality to the 
Union that replaces those already existing, creating a single legal text, and the elimination 
of the pillar-based structure, have an effect on actions abroad. They may have important 
implications for representing the Union abroad, the Union's ability to enter into 
international Treaties, or the coordination among different components of actions abroad, 
in the Community or that are intergovernmental. However, the disappearance of the 
pillars need not mean that all aspects of foreign policy are subject to identical decision-
making procedures. 
The second section of the draft of the Constitutional Treaty, which deals with the 
policies and actions of the Union, contains a Chapter B on "Actions Abroad" that 
includes all of the aspects that make up the Union's present-day foreign policy: trade 
policy, collaborative efforts for development, the foreign dimension of Community 
policies, foreign policy and the common security, crisis management and the closing of 
international agreements. Defence would be regulated under a separate chapter. Such a 
structure, in our opinion, is an over-riding factor in strengthening the Union's actions 
abroad, and above all, in its facet as a civil power of globalisation. In the foreign policy 
area there is some degree of agreement as to the area in which advancements must be 
made -providing solutions to its inadequacies. However, how this is to be accomplished 
is not yet known. 
 
Conclusions: A Timetable and Outlook on the Results of the Debate on the Future 
of Europe  
 
The final version of the Constitutional Treaty will have to be approved at Convention 
headquarters in June 2003, since it has been decided that a short Intergovernmental 
Conference will be held throughout the second quarter of 2003 and that a new Treaty of 
Rome will be passed in December of that year so that it can be ratified in 2004. It is 
foreseeable that said Treaty might go into effect sometime in 2005, which would limit the 
period that the Treaty of Nice would be in effect to a very short term lasting just under 
two years. 
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  24   
A question that arises at this time is whether it would be proper to hold a 
referendum for acceptance in all of the member states, which would serve to reinforce its 
constitutional nature. A referendum has been requested by the federalists; however such 
an idea has been met with opposition from the main foreign ministries that consider it an 
international treaty. 
In theory, if a referendum were held to ratify the Constitutional Treaty on a 
European Union level, it would be valid as a pact of a truly federal nature. However, this 
would present serious problems: first of all, such a consultation would have to be carried 
out in accordance with an election law of uniform application throughout the entire 
Union, a law which does not exist at this time. Secondly, one might ask whether or not all 
of the member states are prepared for it, might it be premature and what is to be done if 
the referendum is not approved in any one of the states. 
The last few days have revealed new developments that may prove to be key in 
the near future. The Franco-German alliance, which has re-emerged for the occasion of 
the European Council in Brussels last week, appears to be determined to reach 
agreements in order to present a strong position that guides the in-depth examination. It is 
known that the British did not like this alliance, which even resulted in a bitter 
confrontation between Blair and Chirac that ended with the suspension of the bilateral 
summit scheduled for the end of the year. The extent to which this conflict may have 
hindered the progress of the Convention projects or may have provided an opportunity to 
achieve two-speed advances in the constitutional model is not known. 
The debate on the future of the Union is gaining importance and growing in scope 
because the Convention is a method that works and, as time goes, the Convention itself is 
turning into a true Constitutional Convention. Evidence of this is that most of the states 
are beginning to send their Foreign or European Affairs Ministers to the Convention; the 
last Minister to arrive was Fischer, the "Father" of the debate on federalism. This fact 
may lead one to ask whether the Convention is becoming more diplomatic. Speaking in 
such extreme terms would seem to be an exaggeration, but the direct involvement of 
governments in the Convention does seem positive, which seems to suggest that the 
future holds a final product that will be a success since it would prevent unreconciled 
differences between the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference. If the 
Convention leads to agreements on a significant number of the matters under 
consideration, we will be talking not so much about a deep examination of the model for 
the Union as a new version of the European venture. 
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